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Abstract
Geo-location database-assisted TV white space network reduces the need of energy-intensive processes (such
as spectrum sensing), hence can achieve green cognitive communication effectively. The success of such a network
relies on a proper business model that provides incentives for all parties involved. In this paper, we propose MINE
GOLD (a Model of INformation markEt for GeO-Location Database), which enables databases to sell the spectrum
information to unlicensed white space devices (WSDs) for profit. Specifically, we focus on an oligopoly information
market with multiple databases, and study the interactions among databases and WSDs using a two-stage hierarchical
model. In Stage I, databases compete to sell information to WSDs by optimizing their information prices. In Stage
II, each WSD decides whether and from which database to purchase the information, to maximize his benefit of
using the TV white space. We first characterize how the WSDs’ purchasing behaviors dynamically evolve, and
what is the equilibrium point under fixed information prices from the databases. We then analyze how the system
parameters and the databases’ pricing decisions affect the market equilibrium, and what is the equilibrium of the
database price competition. Our numerical results show that, perhaps counter-intuitively, the databases’ aggregate
revenue is not monotonic with the number of databases. Moreover, numerical results show that a large degree of
positive network externality would improve the databases’ revenues and the system performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
With the explosive growth of telecommunication industry, 3% of worldwide energy consumption and
2% of the worldwide CO2 emissions have been caused by the information and communication technology
(ICT) infrastructures [1]. Cognitive communication is a promising paradigm for achieving energy-efficient
communications, as a cognitive radio device is able to adapt its configuration and transmission decision
to the radio environment. Such an adaptability enables it to select the best reconfiguration operation
that balances the energy consumption and communication quality. One of the promising commercial
realizations of such cognitive communication technology is the TV white space network, where unlicensed
wireless devices (called white space devices, WSDs) opportunistically exploit the under-utilized broadcast
television spectrum (called TV white space, TVWS1) via a third-party geo-location white space database
[2], [3].
Cognitive communication and TV white space network rely on the accurate detection of radio environ-
ment (e.g., locating the idle channels). However, relying on the mobile device to sense radio environment
usually consumes significant energy. In order to save energy consumption and guarantee the performance
of cognitive communication, some spectrum regulators (e.g., FCC in the USA and Ofcom in the UK)
have advocated a database-assisted TV white space network architecture.
Specifically, the white space database (also called geo-location database) houses a global repository
of TV licensees, and updates the licensees’ channel occupations periodically. Each WSD obtains the
available TV channel information via querying a geo-location database, rather than sensing the wireless
environment that can consume quite some energy. WSDs and databases communicate with each other
through the Internet. In such a database-assisted TV white space network, WSDs perform the necessary
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a database-assisted TV white space network. To access a TV channel, each WSD first reports its location to a white
space database (request), and then the database returns the available channel list to the WSD.
local computations (e.g., identifying the locations) and databases implement the complex data processing
(e.g., computing the available TV channels for each WSD). Such a network architecture can effectively
reduce the energy consumptions of WSDs, and create a green communication ecosystem.
Figure 1 illustrates such a database-assisted TV white space network, with 3 licensed TV stations and 8
unlicensed WSDs. Here WSDs 1 and 2 query the available channel information from database 1, WSDs 3
and 4 query the available channel information from database 2, and WSDs 5 to 8 remain inactive (hence
are not connected with any database in the figure).
The geo-location databases are usually operated by third-party companies, such as Google and Spec-
trumBridge. Hence, the commercial deployment of such a database-assisted network requires a proper
business model, which offers sufficient incentives to the database operators to cover their capital expense
(CapEx) and operating expense (OpEx). The existing business modeling of TV white space network
mainly focused on the spectrum market [4]–[8], where the database operators, acting as spectrum brokers
or agents, sell the TV white spaces to unlicensed WSDs for profit. However, the TV spectrum market
model may not be suitable in practice due to some regulatory considerations. For example, TV white
spaces (especially those not licensed to any TV stations) are usually treated as public resources, and
shared by unlicensed devices. Therefore, it may not be suitable for TV white spaces to be traded in a
spectrum market like other licensed spectrum bands. To this end, a new business model without involving
spectrum trading is highly desirable.
The world first white space database operator certified by FCC – Spectrum Bridge – proposed an
alternative business model called “White Space Plus”. The basic idea is to sell some advanced information
(regarding the quality of TV channels) to WSDs, such that the latter can choose and operate on the high
quality channels. An example of such information is the degree of interference on every available channel.
This essentially leads to an information market, where WSDs purchase the information regarding the
channel quality from the database, instead of purchasing the channel. Clearly, the successful deployment
of such an information market requires (i) an accurate model to evaluate the value of information for
WSDs (buyers), and (ii) a carefully designed pricing strategy for each database. However, none of these
two issues has been considered in the current White Space Plus.2 This motivates us to study the oligopoly
information market model for white space databases in this paper.
2Currently Spectrum Bridge just offers a one year free trial to use this White Space Plus service.
3B. Contributions
In this paper, we present and study a Model of INformation markEt for GeO-Location Database (MINE
GOLD), where multiple databases (sellers) compete to sell the advanced information regarding the quality
of TV channels to WSDs. The WSDs (buyers) decide whether and from which database to purchase
the information. This leads to the following two-stage hierarchical model. In Stage I, each database
determines the information price to WSDs. In Stage II, WSDs decide the best purchasing decisions,
given the information prices of all databases. Note that the WSDs’ behaviors dynamically evolve due to
the positive network externality in the information market, as more WSDs purchasing the information
increases the quality/value of the database’s information and improves the WSDs performance. Such a
performance change further stimulates WSDs to adjust their behaviors in the future, hence the WSDs’
behaviors dynamically evolve.
Through such a two-stage hierarchical model, we will provide insights regarding the databases’ and
WSDs’ strategic decisions. Specifically, we will study the following problems systematically:
• How should each database determine the information price (in Stage I) to maximize his expected
revenue, considering the competition from other databases?
• How will the WSDs’ optimal purchasing behavior (in Stage II) dynamically evolve over time, and
what is the stable market shares3 of databases (also called market equilibrium)?
Both problems are challenging due to the following reasons. First, there is lack of a unified framework
to evaluate the value of information to WSDs. In particular, one database’s known information may not
be the same as the others, and no database has the global information. To this end, we propose a general
framework to evaluate the value of information for WSDs. The framework considers not only the potential
error of the information provided by databases, but also the heterogeneity of WSDs.
Second, the information market has the property of positive network externality, i.e., the more WSDs
purchasing information from the same database, the higher value of that database’s information for each
buyer. This is quite different from traditional spectrum markets which are usually congestion-oriented, i.e.,
the more users purchasing and using the same spectrum, the less value of spectrum for each buyer due to
interferences. Here the positive correlation between the information value and market share complicates the
market behavior analysis, as the change of a single WSD’s purchasing behavior may affect the information
evaluation and purchasing decisions of other WSDs. We show how the market share of each database
dynamically evolves over time, and what is the market equilibrium it eventually converges to.
Third, the competition among multiple databases makes the analysis even more challenging, especially
when considering the positive network externality. This is different from most prior price competition
analysis in the wireless literature, where the users’ decisions are either decoupled [14], [15] or negatively
correlated [16]. Nevertheless, we are able to characterize the conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of the price equilibrium.
As far as we know, this is the first work that systematically studies an oligopoly information market
for TV white space networks. In summary, the key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Novelty and Practical Significance. We consider an oligopoly information market and propose a two-
stage hierarchical business model, which captures the positive network externality of the TV white
space network. Comparing with the traditional spectrum market model, this information market model
better fits the regulatory requirements and industry practice.
• Market Equilibrium Analysis. We characterize the equilibrium of the proposed information market
systematically. Our analysis indicates that given the prices of databases, there may be multiple market
equilibria, and which one will actually emerge depends on the initial market shares of databases. We
further show that some equilibria are stable, in the sense that a small fluctuation on the equilibrium
will drive the market back to the equilibrium, while others are not.
• Competition among databases. We formulate the competition among databases as a price compe-
tition game, and study the existence and uniqueness of the price equilibrium. To do this, we first
3The market shares is the percentage of WSDs purchasing information from the database.
4transform the price competition game into an equivalent market share competition game. Then we
analyze the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the transformed game systematically using
supermodular game theory.
• Observations and Insights. Our numerical results show that, perhaps counter-intuitively, the databases’
aggregate revenue first increases and then decreases with the number of databases. Intuitively, there
is a trade-off between the decreasing equilibrium prices and the increasing market shares for the
databases. Extensive simulations show that having two databases will maximize the databases’ ag-
gregate revenue under a wide range of system parameters. Moreover, our numerical results show that
a large degree of positive network externality would improve the databases’ revenues and the system
performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II. we review the related literature. In Section III,
we present the system model. In Sections IV and V, we study the monopoly and competitive network
scenarios, respectively. In Section, we provide numerical results. Finally, we conclude in Section VII. We
provide the detail proofs in the appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
Most of the existing studies on cognitive green communications focused on the technical issues such
as spectrum sharing, resource optimization, and platform implementation [18]–[20]. In [18], Palicot
demonstrated how to apply cognitive radio technology to achieve green radio communications. In [19],
Gu¨t et al. studied the trade-off among energy efficiency, performance, and practicality in cognitive radio
network. In [20], Ji et al. proposed a platform to explore TV white space in order to achieve green
communication in cognitive radio network. However, none of the above studies considered the incentives
issues in implementing such a cognitive radio network. Without a proper business model to provide
sufficient incentives to the involved parties such as spectrum licensees and the network operators, it is
difficult to envision strong commercialisation of this new technology.
Prior studies related to the business modeling of TV white space networks mainly focused on the
spectrum trading market [4]–[9]. In [4], Niyato et al. proposed a hierarchical spectrum trading model to
analyze the interaction among service providers, TV licensees, and users. In [5], Luo et al. studied the
(dedicated) TVWS reservation problem for a single database. In [6], Bogucka et al. discussed a spectrum
trading mechanism implemented by the spectrum broker in TV white spaces. In [7], Feng et al. studied
the hybrid pricing scheme for the database manager. In [9], Luo et al. discussed the price-Inventory
competition game among multiple databases. The key idea of this spectrum trading market is to let the
databases, acting as spectrum brokers or agents, sell the TV white spaces to WSDs for profit. However,
TV spectrum trading may not always be possible as TV white spaces are sometimes considered as public
spectrum resources and need to be used in a shared fashion. Some recent studies [10]–[13] proposed the
pure and hybrid information models for TV white spaces. However, these studies focused either on a
single database or two competitive databases. In this work, we consider a more general oligopoly market
with many competitive databases.
Price competition in a market can be modeled as a non-cooperative game. In [14], Niyato et al. studied
the problem of spectrum trading with multiple licensed users selling spectrum opportunities to multiple
unlicensed users, and proposed an iterative algorithm to achieve the Nash equilibrium in this competitive
network. In [15], Kasbekar et al. analyzed price competition in spectrum trading market, jointly considering
both bandwidth uncertainty and spatial reuse. However, in all of the above works, the market is usually
assumed to be associated with the negative network externality or non-externality. In our work, as will
be discussed later, the information market is associated with the positive network externality. This makes
our market analysis quite different with the above works.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a database-assisted TV white space network with a set M = {1, . . . ,M} of geo-location
databases and a set of N unlicensed users (devices) operating on TV channels. The databases hold the
5list of TV licensees, update the licensees’ channel occupations information periodically, and calculate a
set of available TV channels (i.e., unlicensed TV channels or those are not occupied by the licensees).
The available TV channels are also called TV white spaces, which can be used by unlicensed users freely
in a shared manner (e.g., using CDMA or CSMA). Each WSD queries a database for the available TV
channel set, and can only operate on one of the available channels at any time.
A. Geo-location Database
Motivated by t he current commercial examples, the database provides the following two services to
the WSDs.
1) Basic Service: According to the regulation policy (e.g., [2]), it is mandatory for a geo-location white
space database to provide the following information for any unlicensed WSD: (i) the list of TV white
spaces (i.e., unlicensed TV channels), and (ii) the transmission constraint (e.g., maximum transmission
power) on each channel in the list. The database needs to provide this basic (information) service free of
charge for any unlicensed user.
2) Advanced Service: Beyond the basic information, each database can also provide certain advanced
information regarding the quality of TV channels (as SpectrumBridge does in White Space Plus), which
we call the advanced (information) service, as long as it does not conflict with the free basic service.
Such an advanced information can be rather general, and a typical example is the “interference level on
each channel”. With the advanced information, the WSD is able to choose a channel with the highest
quality (e.g., with the lowest interference level). Hence, the database can sell this advanced information to
users for profit. This leads to an information market. For convenience, let pim ≥ 0 denote the (advanced)
information price of database m, m ∈M.
WSDs need to interact with databases periodically for the basic service or advanced service. The length
of each interaction period (called frame) will be subject to the regulatory constraint, e.g., 15 minutes
according to the latest Ofcom rule. In this work, we focus on the interactions of WSDs and databases in
a particular frame, where databases announce their prices at the beginning of the frame, and then WSDs
choose actions that last for the entire frame.
B. White Space Devices
After obtaining the available channel list through the free basic service, each WSD has M +2 choices
(denoted by l) in terms of channel selection:
(i) l = b: Inquires one database and chooses the basic service (i.e., randomly chooses an available
channel) provided by the chosen database;
(ii) l = s: Inquires one database to obtain the list of available channels and senses all the available
channels to determine the best one at the cost c;4
(iii) l = m: Subscribes to database m’s advanced service, and picks the channel with the best quality
indicated by database m.
Here we assume that the sensing is perfect without errors, hence a WSD can always choose the best
channel when choosing the sensing service. We further denote B, S, and Am as the expected utility that
a WSD can achieve from choosing the basic service (l = b), sensing (l = s), and the advanced service
of database m (l = m), respectively. As all the databases provide the same basic information (i.e., the
available channel set), WSDs would achieve the same expected utility from choosing the basic service
(i.e., l = b) or from choosing sensing (i.e., l = s), no matter which database they inquire. However, the
expected utility from choosing different databases’ advanced services (i.e., l = m) can be different, as
databases may hold different qualities of information.
The payoff of a WSD is defined as the difference between the achieved utility and the service cost
(i.e., the information price when choosing the advanced service, or the sensing cost if choosing sensing
4The sensing cost c can be used for characterizing the energy consumption cost of a WSD for performing spectrum sensing.
6by itself). Let θ denote the WSD’s evaluation for the achieved utility. Then, the payoff of a WSD with
an evaluation factor θ is
ΠEUθ =


θ · B, if l = b,
θ · S − c, if l = s,
θ · Am − pim, if l = m.
(1)
Each WSD is rational and will choose a strategy l ∈ {b, s,m} that maximizes its payoff. Note that
different WSDs may have different values of θ (e.g., depending on application types), hence have different
choices. That is, WSDs are heterogeneous in term of θ. For convenience, we assume that θ is uniformly
distributed in [0, 1] for all WSDs5.
Let ηB, ηs, and ηm denote the the fraction of WSDs choosing the basic service, sensing, and the advanced
service of database m, respectively. For convenience, we refer the fraction of WSDs choosing particular
service as the market share of such service. Obviously, ηB, ηs, ηm ≥ 0 and ηB+ηs+
∑
m∈M ηm = 1. Hence,
the payoff of the database m ∈ M, which is defined as the difference between the revenue obtained by
providing the advanced service and the cost, is
ΠDB = (pim − cm) · ηm ·N, (2)
where cm denotes database m’s energy consumption cost when providing the advance service to one
WSD.
C. Positive Network Externality
Note that the information market has the property of positive network externality. This is because the
more WSDs subscribing to the advanced service, the more accurate the database’s information is, and
further the more benefit for the WSDs subscribing to the advanced service. Next we analytically quantify
this positive network externality. We first list important assumptions made in this paper to clarify the
scenario on which we focus. All these assumptions have been verified to be reasonable through extensive
simulations, where the advanced information is the interference level on each channel. We provide more
detailed modeling and formulation for such interference information in Appendix.
Assumption 1. B and S are independent of ηB, ηm, and ηs.
The reason for this assumption is as follows. From the system perspective, each WSD will access a
channel randomly and independently. First, WSDs choosing the basic service will access one TV channel
randomly. Second, WSDs choosing sensing will always access their best TV channels, and the best
channels for different WSDs are independent. Hence, from the system perspective, all the WSDs will be
randomly and uniformly distributed in all the channels. Hence, the utility provided by the basic service
or sensing depends on the average number of WSDs in each channel, while not on the detailed numbers
of WSDs using different services.
Assumption 2. Am is non-decreasing in ηm.
This assumption actually reflects the positive network externality in the information market. Namely,
the more users subscribing to database m’s advanced service, the higher quality of the database m’s
information. For more details, please refer to Appendix.
Assumption 3. S ≥ Am ≥ B.
The reason behind S ≥ Am is that sensing is perfect and can enable a WSD to locate the optimal TV
channel.6 The reason behind Am ≥ B is that WSDs can achieve additional performance gains from the
advanced information provided by any database. Note that if Am < B, then we have the trivial case that
WSDs will never choose the advanced service even when the information price pim = 0.
5This assumption is commonly used in the existing literature, e.g., [16]. Relaxing to more general distributions often does not change the
main insights.
6We will study the impact of imperfect sensing in our future work.
7Stage I: Price Competition Game
Database determines the information price;
⇓
Stage II: WSD Behaving and Market Dynamics
WSDs determine and update their best choices;
The market dynamically evolves to the equilibrium point.
Fig. 2. Two-stage Interaction Model
For convenience, we write Am as a non-decreasing function of ηm, m ∈M, i.e., Am(ηm) , g(ηm).
Note that function g(·) reflects the performance gain induced by the advanced information, i.e., the
(advanced) information value. We further introduce the following assumptions on functions g(·).
Assumption 4. Function g(·) is non-negative, non-decreasing, concave, and continuously differentiable.
Assumption 4 results form the diminishing marginal performance improvement induced by the advanced
information. Such a generic function g(·) can cover a wide range of application specific definitions of the
advanced information, e.g., the interference level on each channel. The detailed discussion is provided in
Appendix.
D. Two-Stage Interaction Model
Based on the above discussion, an information market captures the interactions among the geo-location
databases and the WSDs. Hence, we formulate the interactions as a two-stage hierarchical model illustrated
in Figure 2. Specifically, in Stage I, each database determines the advanced information price pim. In Stage
II, WSDs determine their best choices, and dynamically update their choices based on the current market
shares. Accordingly, the market dynamically evolves and finally reaches the equilibrium point.
In Section IV, we will first analyze a simple monopoly information market with a single database to
facilitate the understanding of this market. Then in Section V, we will analyze a more general oligopoly
information market with multiple databases.
IV. MONOPOLY INFORMATION MARKET
We first consider a simple monopoly scenario, where a single database provides TV white space
information service to WSDs. We will denote the monopoly database as database 1. This case study
will serve as a benchmark for the later discussions of the oligopoly market in Section V. In what follows,
we study the two-stage model by backward induction. Namely, we first study the WSDs’s subscription
behaviour and market equilibrium in Stage II. Then, based on the market analysis, we study the monopoly
database’s best pricing decision that maximizes its revenue in Stage I.
A. WSDs’ Best Strategy
As Assumption 2 shows that the utility provided by the advanced service of database 1 is varying
with the database’s market share, each WSD will form a belief on the utility of database 1 and make a
subscription decision. For convenience, we introduce a virtual time-discrete system with slots t = 1, 2, . . .,
where WSDs change their decisions at the beginning of every slot, based on the derived market shares in
the previous slot.7 Let ηt1 denote the market share derived at the end of slot t. Then we consider a WSD’s
best strategy at the end of slot t, given the market share {ηtB, ηts, ηt1} where ηtB + ηts + ηt1 = 1.
When there is only one database operating in the TV white space market, each WSD has three choices:
(i) chooses the basic service by randomly choosing a channel from the available channel set, i.e., s = b,
with zero cost; (ii) senses all the available channels to determine the best one, i.e., s = s with the sensing
cost c; and (iii) subscribes to the advanced service of the (only) database 1, i.e., s = 1, and pays the
database 1 an information price pi1. Notice that each WSD will choose a strategy that maximizes its payoff
7The main purpose of introducing the virtual time-discrete system is to characterize the relation between the price and the market
equilibrium, and to facilitate the calculation of database’s optimal price strategy later. Such an analysis technique has been extensively
adopted in the existing literature, e.g., [16], [17].
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Fig. 3. Illustration of θtSB , θtAB , and θtSA in slot t.
defined in (1). Hence, given the market share {ηtB, ηts, ηt1} with ηtB + ηts + ηt1 = 1, a type-θ WSD’s best
strategy is 8 

s∗θ = b, iff θ · B > max{θ · A1(ηt1)− pi1, θ · S − c}
s∗θ = s, iff θ · S − c > max{θ · B, θ ·A1(ηt1)− pi1}
s∗θ = 1, iff θ ·A1(ηt1)− pi1 > max{θ · B, θ · S − c}
(3)
where A1(ηt1) = g(ηt1), and B < A1(ηt1) < S based on Assumptions 1 and 2.
To better illustrate the above best strategy, we introduce the following notations:
θtSB ,
c
S−B
, θtAB ,
pi1
A1(ηt1)−B
, θtSA ,
c−pi1
S−A1(ηt1)
.
Intuitively, θtSB denotes the smallest θ such that a type-θ WSD prefers sensing than the basic service; θtAB
denotes the smallest θ such that a type-θ WSD prefers the advanced service than the basic service; and
θtSA denotes the smallest θ such that a type-θ WSD prefers sensing than the advanced service. Notice that
A1(η
t
1) is a function of the market share ηt1. Hence, θtAB and θtSA are also functions of ηt1.
Figure 3 illustrates two possible relationships of θtSB, θtAB, and θtSA9. Intuitively, Figure 3 implies that
WSDs with a high utility evaluation factor θ are more willing to choose sensing in order to achieve the
maximum utility. WSDs with a low utility evaluation factor θ are more willing to choose the basic service,
so that they will pay zero cost. WSDs with a middle utility evaluation factor θ are willing to choose the
advanced service, in order to achieve a relatively large utility with a relatively low service cost. Notice
that when the information price pi1 is high or the information value (i.e., A1(ηt1) − B) is low, we could
have θtSB < θtAB, in which no users will choose the advanced service (as illustrated in the lower subfigure
of Figure 3).
Next we characterize the market shares in slot t + 1, resulting from the WSDs’ best choices in slot
t. Such derived market shares are important for analyzing the market evolution in the next subsection.
Assume that all WSDs update the best strategies once and simultaneously. Recall that θ is uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Then, given any market share ηt1 in slot t, the market share ηt+11 in slot t+ 1 is
• If θtSB > θtAB, then ηt+11 = θtSA − θtAB;
• If θtSB ≤ θtAB, then ηt+11 = 0.
Formally, we have the following market share in slot t+ 1.
Lemma 1. Given database 1’s market share ηt1 at the end of slot t, the market share ηt+11 in slot t + 1
is given by
ηt+11 = max
{
min{θtSA, 1} − θ
t
AB, 0
}
. (4)
As θtAB and θtSA are functions of the market share ηt1, the market share ηt+11 in slot t + 1 is also a
function of ηt1, and hence can be written as ηt+11 (ηt1).
8Here, “iff” stands for “if and only if”. We omit the cases of θ ·B = max{θ ·S−c, θ ·A1(ηt1)−pi1}, θ ·S−c = max{θ ·B, θ ·A1(ηt1)−pi1},
and θ · A1(ηt1)− pi1 = max{θ · S − c, θ ·B}, which are negligible due to the continuous distribution assumption of θ.
9Note that we only need to compare the value of θtSB and θtAB to get the relationship of θtSB , θtAB , and θtSA .
9B. Market Dynamics and Equilibrium
When the market share of database 1 changes, the WSDs’ payoffs (when choosing the advanced service)
change accordingly, as A1(ηt1) changes. As a result, WSDs will update their best strategies continuously,
hence the market shares will evolve dynamically, until reaching a stable point (called market equilibrium).
In this subsection, we will study such a market dynamics and equilibrium, under a fixed price pi1.
Base on analysis in Section IV-A, let η01 denote the initial market share in slot t = 0 and ηt1 denote the
market share derived at the end of slot t. We further denote △η1 as the change of market share between
two successive time slots, e.g., t and t+ 1, that is,
△η1(η
t
1) = η
t+1
1 − η
t
1, (5)
where ηt+11 is the derived market share in slot t+ 1, which can be computed by Lemma 1. Obviously, if
△η1 is zero in slot t+ 1, i.e., ηt+11 = ηt1, then WSDs will no longer change their strategies in the future.
This implies that the market achieves a stable state, which we call the market equilibrium. Formally,
Definition 1 (Monopoly Market Equilibrium). A market share ηt1 in slot t is a market equilibrium iff
△η1(η
t
1) = 0. (6)
Definition 1 implies that once the market share satisfies (6) in slot t, the market share remains the same
from that time slot on. For notational convenience, we will also denote the market equilibrium by η∗1 .
Next, we study the existence of the market equilibrium, and further characterize the market equilibrium
analytically. Specifically, we will show that under a fixed price pi1, there may be multiple equilibria, and
which one will eventually emerge depends on database’s initial market share (i.e., market share in slot
t = 0). Besides, some equilibria are stable in the sense that a small fluctuation around these equilibria
will not drive the market share away from the equilibria, while some equilibria are unstable in the sense
that a tiny fluctuation on these equilibria will drive the market share to a different equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Existence). Given any fixed price pi1 and sensing cost c, there exists at least one market
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). Given any fixed price pi1 and sensing cost c, there exists a unique market
equilibrium η∗1 if
maxη1∈[0,1]
A′1(η1)
A1(η1)−B
· S−B
S−A1(η1)
≤ κ2, (7)
where κ2 = 1/maxη1∈[0,1] θSA(η1).
Recall that g(η1) is concave in η1 and A1(η1) = g(η1) by Assumption 4. Hence, a practical implication
of (7) is that if the information value A1(η1) (i.e., the positive network externality) increases slowly with
η1, then there exists a unique equilibrium. Note that the condition (7) is sufficient but not necessary for
the uniqueness. Simulations show that the market converges to a unique equilibrium for a wide range
of prices, under which the condition (7) can be violated. Nevertheless, the condition in (7) leads to the
insight that if the change of positive network externality is slow, there exists a unique equilibrium point.
Suppose the uniqueness condition (7) is satisfied. Let Amin1 be the minimum expected utility that a
WSD can achieve from choosing the advanced service of monopoly database 1. Correspondingly, let
θmaxAB =
pi1
Amin1 −B
be the corresponding value when A1 = Amin1 . We characterize the unique equilibrium by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Market Equilibrium). Suppose the uniqueness condition (7) holds. Then, for any price pi1
and sensing cost c, the unique market equilibrium is given by
(a) If θmaxAB < θSB, then there is a unique market equilibrium η∗1 given by
η∗1 = min{θSA(η
∗
1), 1} − θAB(η
∗
1). (8)
(b) If θmaxAB ≥ θSB, then there is a unique market equilibrium η†1 given by
η†1 = 0. (9)
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Theorem 1 shows that if the information value (i.e., Amin1 − B) is low, then θmaxAB ≥ θSB and no WSDs
will choose the advanced service in the market equilibrium. Only when the information value is high
enough (i.e., θmaxAB < θSB ), the database 1 can obtain the positive market equilibrium.
C. Revenue Maximization
Based on the market equilibrium analysis in the previous subsection, we will study the optimal infor-
mation pricing strategy of the monopoly database 1 that maximizes its payoff, i.e.,
ΠDB1 (pi1) = (pi1 − c1) · η
∗
1(pi1) (10)
where c1 is the operational cost of the database that characterizes the energy consumption of the database
to provide the advanced service, and η∗1 is the equilibrium point of the WSD subscription dynamics at
price pi1 given by Theorem 1.
Directly solving the optimal price that maximizes (10) is very challenging, due to the difficulty in
analytically characterizing the market equilibrium η1(pi1) under a particular price pair pi1. To this end, we
transform the original price maximization problem into an equivalent market share maximization problem.
The key idea is to view the market share as the strategy of the database, and the price as a function of
the market share.
Furthermore, under the uniqueness condition (7), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
market equilibrium η∗1 and the prices pi1. In this sense, once the monopoly database 1 chooses the prices
pi1, it has equivalently chosen the market share η∗1 (given the fixed sensing cost). Hence, we obtain the
equivalent market share maximization problem, where the strategy of the database is its market share
(i.e., η1), and the prices pi1 is the function of the market share η1. Let Amax1 be the maximum expected
utility that a WSD can achieve from choosing the advanced service of monopoly database 1, i.e., when
all WSDs choose database 1’s advanced service. Then substitute θSA = c−pi1S−A1(η1) and θAB =
pi1
A1(η1)−B
into
(8) and (9), we can derive the inverse function of (8) and (9), where price is a function of market share,
i.e.,
(a) Low sensing cost: c < S −Amax1 ,
pi1(η1) =
S−A1(η1)
S−B
·
(
c
S−A1(η1)
− η1
)
·
[
A1(η1)− B
]
. (11)
(b) High sensing cost: c ≥ S −Amax1 ,
pi1(η1) = (1− η1) ·
[
A1(η1)− B
]
. (12)
Accordingly, the revenue of the monopoly database can be written as:
ΠDB1 (η1) = (pi1(η1)− c1) · η1 (13)
We first show the equivalence between the price maximization problem and the market share maxi-
mization problem.
Proposition 3 (Equivalence). If η∗ is an optimal solution of (13), then pi∗1 calculated by substituting η∗
into (11) or (12) is an optimal solution of (10).
We can easily check that the database’s revenue in (13) is monotonic in η1 ∈ [0, 1], hence we have:
Proposition 4 (Optimal Information Pricing). There exists a unique optimal solution pi∗1 for the database,
where for
(a) low sensing cost: c < S − Amax1 ,
pi∗1 ,
S−A1(η
†
1)
S−B
·
(
c
S−A1(η
†
1)
− η†1
)
·
[
A1(η
†
1)−B
]
, (14)
(b) high sensing cost: c ≥ S − Amax1 ,
pi∗1 , (1− η
‡
1) ·
[
A(η‡1)− B
]
, (15)
where η†1 is the solution of A1(η1)−BS−B c+
(
c
S−B
+ 2A1(η1)−S−B
S−B
η1
)dA(η1)
dη1
η1−2η1
S−A1(η1)
S−B
[
A1(η1)−B
]
−c1 = 0,
and η‡1 is the solution of A(η1)−B + (1−η1)·η11−2η1 ·
dA(η1)
dη1
− c1
1−2η1
= 0.
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V. OLIGOPOLY INFORMATION MARKET
In this section, we study the general competition scenario, where M databases compete for selling
information to the same pool of WSDs. In such an oligopoly information market, M databases (the
leaders) first choose their own information prices independently. Then, WSDs (the followers) subscribe to
different services accordingly. Similar as in the monopoly scenario, we will study the oligopoly information
market by backward induction.
A. Stage II - Users Behavior and Market Equilibrium
Similar as in Sections IV-A and IV-B, we study the WSD behavior and market dynamics in this section,
given the databases’ information prices pim, m ∈ M, and the sensing cost c.
We first consider a WSD’s best strategy at the end of slot t, where the market shares are {ηtB, ηts, ηtm}
with ηtB + ηts +
∑M
m=1 η
t
m = 1. A type-θ WSD at the time slot t + 1 will
(i) subscribes to the basic service and randomly chooses a channel, i.e., s∗θ = b, iff
θ ·B > max{θ · S − c, max
m∈M
(θ · Am(η
t
m)− pim)}, (16)
(ii) senses all the available channels to determine the best one, i.e., s∗θ = s, iff
θ · S − c > max{θ · B, max
m∈M
(θ · Am(η
t
m)− pim)}, (17)
(iii) subscribes to the database m’s advanced service, i.e., s∗θ = m, iff
θ · Am(η
t
m)− pim >max{θ ·B, θ · S − c, max
n∈M,n 6=m
(θ · An(η
t
n)− pin)}, (18)
where m = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
Without loss of generality, we suppose that the market shares of M databases in time slot t are ordered
as: ηtM > η
t
M−1 > . . . > η
t
1, and accordingly, we have: S > AM(ηtM) > AM−1(ηtM−1) > . . . > A1(ηt1).
Notice that no WSD would like to choose a service with a lower QoS and a higher price. Therefore, we
will consider the non-trivial scenario with c > piM > piM−1 > . . . > pi1.
To better illustrate the best strategy in (16)-(18), we introduce the following notations:
θtS ,
c− piM
S −AM(ηtM)
, θtB ,
pi1
A1(ηt1)−B
, θtm ,
pim − pim−1
Am(ηtm)−Am−1(η
t
m−1)
, m = 2, 3, ...,M,
where θtS denotes the marginal WSD who is indifferent between sensing all the available channels or
subscribing to the advanced service of database M ; θtB denotes the marginal WSD who is indifferent
between randomly choosing a channel or subscribing to the advanced service of database 1; and θtm
denotes the marginal WSD who is indifferent between subscribing to the advanced service of database m
or database m− 1.
Next we characterize the market shares in slot t + 1, resulting from the WSDs’ best choices in slot t.
We assume that all WSDs update the best strategies once and simultaneously. Recall that θ is uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. Then, we have the following market shares in slot t+ 1.
Lemma 2. Given market shares {ηt1, ηt2, . . . , ηtM} in slot t with ηtM > ηtM−1 > . . . > ηt1, the newly market
shares in slot t+ 1 are: 

ηtM = θ
t
S − θ
t
M ,
ηtm = θ
t
m+1 − θ
t
m, m = 2, 3, . . . ,M − 1
ηt1 = θ
t
2 − θ
t
B.
(19)
For notational convenience, we denote ηtA = (ηt1, . . . , ηtM) as the vector of all databases’ market shares
in slot t. Besides, we denote ηt−m = (ηt1, . . . , ηtm−1, ηtm+1, . . . , ηtM) as the market shares vector of all
databases except database m. We also denote η0A as the initial market share in slot t = 0. As θtS, θtB, and
θtm are functions of the market shares ηtA, the market shares ηt+1A in the next slot t+1 are also functions
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of ηtA. and hence can be written as ηt+1m (ηtA), ∀m ∈ M. We further let △ηm as the change of database
m’s market share between two successive time slots, e.g., t and t+ 1, that is,
△ηm(ηtA) = η
t+1
m (η
t
A)− η
t
m, (20)
where ηt+1m is the derived market share of the database m ∈M in slot t+ 1, which can be computed by
Lemma 2. Then we give the definition of an equilibrium point, which is similar to Definition 1.
Definition 2 (Oligopoly Market Equilibrium). A set of market shares ηt in slot t is a market equilibrium
iff
△ηm(η
t
A) = 0, ∀m ∈M. (21)
Definition 2 implies that once the market shares set satisfy (21) in slot t, the market share set remains
the same from that time slot on. We will denote the market equilibrium by η∗A.
Based on the Definition 2, we can characterize the equilibrium by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Market Equilibrium). For any prices set {pim}m∈M and WSDs’ sensing cost c, the market
equilibrium is given by: 

η∗M = θS(η
∗
A)− θM(η
∗
A),
η∗m = θm+1(η
∗
A)− θm(η
∗
A), m = 2, 3, . . . ,M − 1
η∗1 = θ2(η
∗
A)− θB(η
∗
A).
(22)
Proving the uniqueness of maker equilibrium is challenging due to the difficulty in anaylzing (22).
However, extensive simulations show that, even if there exist multiple market share equilibrium points,
the market always converges to a unique one under fixed initial market shares. Hence, we have the
following proposition which is important in analyzing the price competition game in Stage I.
Proposition 5. Given the initial market shares (i.e., the market shares achieved in slot t = 0), the market
always converges to a unique market share equilibrium.
B. Stage I - Price Competition Game Equilibrium
In this section, we study the interaction among M databases in Stage I. Specifically, in this section
we will formulate the interactions among databases as a price competition game, and study the Nash
equilibrium systematically.
We first define the price competition game (PCG), denoted by Γ = (M, {pim}m∈M, {ΠDBm }m∈M), where
• M is the set of game players (databases);
• pim is the strategy of database m, where pim ≥ 0;
• ΠDBm is the revenue of database m defined in (2).
For notational convenience, we denote pi = (pi1, . . . , piM) as the vector of all databases’ information
prices. Besides, we denote pi−m = (pi1, . . . , pim−1, pim+1, . . . , piM ) as the price vectors of all databases
except m. We also write the (assuming unique) market equilibrium η∗ = {η∗1, . . . , η∗M} in Stage II as
functions of prices pi = {pi1, . . . , piM}, i.e., η∗(pi). Intuitively, we can interpret η∗m(·) as the demand
functions of database m. Moreover, the database m’s market share ηm depends not only on its own price
pim, but also on other databases’ price pi−m. By (2), the revenue of the database m is:
ΠDBm (pim,pi−m) = (pim − cm) · η
∗
m(pim,pi−m). (23)
Definition 3 (Price Equilibrium). A price profile {pi∗m}m∈M is called a price equilibrium, if
pi∗m = arg max
pim≥0
ΠDBm (pim,pi
∗
−m), ∀m ∈M (24)
Directly solving the price equilibrium in (24) is very challenging, due to the difficulty in analytically
characterizing the market equilibrium {η∗A(pi)} under a particular price pair pi. Hence, we transform the
price competition game (PCG) into an equivalent market share competition game (MSCG). The key idea
is to view the market shares as the strategy of databases, and the prices as functions of the market shares.
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Based on Proposition 5, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the market equilibrium {η∗−m}
and the prices {pi} given fixed the initial market shares. In this sense, once the databases choose the prices
{pim}m∈M, they have equivalently chosen the market shares {η∗−m}m∈M. Hence, we obtain the equivalent
market share competition game—MSCG, where the strategy of each player is its market share (i.e., ηm
for the database m), and the prices {pim}m∈M are functions of the market shares {ηm}m∈M. Substitute
θS ,
c−piM
S−AM(η−m)
, θB ,
pi1
A1(η−m)−B
, and θm , pim−pim−1Am(η−m)−Am−1(η−m) into (22), we can derive the inverse
function of (22) by recursion, where prices are functions of market shares, i.e.,10
pim =
M+1∑
m=1
[(
1−
M+1∑
n=m
ηn
)
· (g(ηm)− g(ηm−1))
]
(25)
where ηM+1 = ηs, g(ηM+1) = S, and g(η0) = B.
Accordingly, the revenue of database m ∈M is:
Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m) = (pim(ηm,η−m)− cm) · ηm. (26)
Similarly, a pair of market shares {η∗m}m∈M is called a Nash equilibrium of MSCG, if
η∗m = argmax
ηm
Π˜DBm (ηm,η
∗
−m), ∀m ∈M.
We first show that the equivalence between the original PCG and the above MSCG.
Proposition 6 (Equivalence). If η∗A is a Nash equilibrium of MSCG, then pi∗ given by (25) is a Nash
equilibrium of the original price competition game PCG.
We can check that Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m) for m ∈ M is a decreasing differential function11. Hence, under
duopoly databases scenario (with two databases), the MSCG is a supermodular game (with a straightfor-
ward strategy transformation), and hence the market share equilibrium of MSCG can be easily obtained
by using the supermodular game theory [21].
Lemma 3 (Existence of Market Equilibrium under Duopoly Scenario). A duopoly MSCG is a supermod-
ular game with respect to η1 and −η2. Hence, there exists at least one market share equilibrium.
Note that the MSCG under oligopoly scenario (i.e., the number of databases M ≥ 3) cannot be
transformed into supermodular game. In order to study oligopoly scenario, we consider a special case
where the positive network externality of database m ∈M is characterized as
g(ηm) = αm + (βm − αm) · ηm
γm , (27)
where γm ∈ (0, 1]. Then we can show that Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m) under function gm is quasiconcave in ηm. This
is sufficient for guaranteeing a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium [22].
The reasons that we use (27) to characterize the positive network externality are as follows. αm denotes
the minimum benefit brought by the database m’s knowledge of licensees’ channel occupation information,
and βm denotes the maximum benefit brought by the database’s advanced information. The parameter
γm ∈ (0, 1] characterizes the elasticity of the network externality. Note that this function generalizes the
linear network externality models in many existing literatures such as [23].
Proposition 7 (Existence of Market Equilibrium under Oligopoly Scenario). Given the positive network
externally function (27), the revenue function Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m), ∀m ∈M in MSCG is quasi-concave in ηm.
Hence, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium η∗A.
Proof of Proposition 7 is similar to the analysis of the price competition game model in [24].
10We omit the trivial case where some databases have a zero market share, as this will never the case at the pricing equilibrium of Stage
I.
11A function f(x1, x2) has decreasing differences in (x1, x2) if for all x1 ≥ x′1, the difference f(x1, x2)− f(x′1, x2) is nonincreasing in
x2. If the function f is twice differentiable, the property is equivalent to ∂2f/∂x1∂x2 ≤ 0.
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Fig. 4. (a) Price equilibrium, (b) Market share equilibrium, (c) The system performance vs the number of databases.
We then apply the contraction mapping method to establish the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under
both duopoly and oligopoly scenarios. By applying the contraction mapping approach, the uniqueness is
assured when the following condition is satisfied [25]:
−
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂(−ηm)
2 ≥
∑
j 6=m
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂(−ηm)∂ηn
, ∀m ∈M. (28)
We can check that the MSCG game under both duopoly and oligopoly scenarios given gm = αm +
(βm − αm) · ηmγm satisfies the above condition. Hence, we have:
Proposition 8 (Uniqueness under Both Duopoly and Oligopoly Scenarios). Given the positive network
externally function (27), The MSCG with M ≥ 2 databases has a unique Nash equilibrium η∗A.
Once we obtain the Nash equilibrium η∗A of MSCG, we can immediately obtain the Nash equilibrium
pi
∗ of the original PCG by (25). Notice that we may not be able to derive the analytical Nash equilibrium
of MSCG, as we use the generic function g(·). Nevertheless, because the objective function of database
m, m ∈M is quasiconcave, we can numerically compute the Nash equilibrium of MSCG through several
standard algorithms such as the ellipsoid algorithm in [26].
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically illustrate the NE of the database competition game, and evaluate the
system performance (e.g., the network profit and the databases’ revenue) at the NE. We will focus on
the impact of system parameters (i.e. the number of databases, the network effect, the positive network
externality, and the database’s operational cost) on system performance. As a concrete example, we will use
(27) to model the positive network externality. Unless specified otherwise, we assume that B = 2, S = 8,
αm = 4.8, and βm = 6, m ∈ M. The databases’ initial market shares satisfy ηM > ηM−1 > . . . > η1. In
all the simulation figures, we denote sensing service as S, basic service as B, and database m ∈M
as m.
A. System Performance vs Number of Databases
Figure 4 illustrates (a) market share equilibrium, (b) price equilibrium, and (c) the system performance
achieved under different numbers of databases (M from 1 to 5). In this simulation, we fix the sensing
cost as c = 2, the network externality impact as γm = 0.4, and the database’s operation cost as cm = 0,
m ∈M.
Figure 4.a shows the price equilibrium achieved under different numbers of databases. We can see that
the equilibrium prices decrease with the number of databases, as the intensity of competition increases.
When the number of databases increases, the difference among the databases’ initial market shares becomes
smaller as
∑
m∈M ηm = 1. Hence, the difference among databases’ price equilibrium also decreases as
M becomes large.
Figure 4.b shows the equilibrium market share under different numbers of databases. Each bar denotes
the market shares of the basic service (denoted as “B”), databases’ advanced services (denoted as the
database index m), and sensing (denoted as “S”). We can see that the databases’ market shares increase
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Fig. 5. (a) Price equilibrium, (b) Market share equilibrium, (c) The system performance vs positive network externality. A small value of
γ corresponds to a high level of positive network externality.
with the number of databases. As databases’ equilibrium prices decrease with the number of databases,
more WSDs will purchase the advanced services, hence increasing the market shares of the databases as
M increases.
Figure 4.c shows each database’s revenue and the total social welfare (i.e., the total revenue of all
databases plus the total payoffs of WSDs) achieved at the NE, given different numbers of databases. Each
bar denotes the aggregated revenue of M databases, while each sub-bar corresponds to the payoff of
database m. The dash red line denotes the value of social welfare. The left y-axis denotes the value of
databases’ revenues, and the right y-axis denotes the value of social welfare.
From Figure 4.c, we can see that the databases’ aggregated revenue is a quasi-concave (i.e., first
increasing and then decreasing) function of the number of databases M . This is because two things happen
when M increases: (i) more intensive competition drives the equilibrium prices down for all databases,
which reduces the revenue of each single database, (ii) low prices attract more WSDs to purchase the
advanced services, which leads to the increase the overall databases’ revenue. In this simulation, M = 2
achieves the best trade-off and maximizes the databases’ total revenue.
Figure 4.c shows that the social welfare increases with the number of databases. As the competition
among databases reduce the equilibrium prices, more WSDs choose to use the advanced services, which
offers a better quality of service than the basic service and a lower cost than the sensing. Overall this
improves the social welfare.
B. System Performance vs Network Externality
Figure 5 illustrates (a) market share equilibrium, (b) price equilibrium, and (c) the system performance
achieved under different levels of network externality (e.g., γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = γ changes from 1 to 0, hence
the positive network externality changes from weak to strong). According to (27), a small γm means that
the value of g(ηm) can be reasonably large even with a small ηm. Hence, a small value of γ represents
a high level of network externality. In this simulation, we fix the sensing cost as c = 2, the number of
database M = 3, and the database’s operation cost as cm = 0, m ∈M.
Figure 5.a shows the equilibrium prices of positive network externality. We can see that the databases’
equilibrium prices increases with the level of network externality. This is because a higher level of positive
network externality will make the utility provided by the database’s advanced service reasonably large
even when the database has a small market share. This leads to a less intensive competition for the market
share, hence drives the equilibrium prices up. Figure 5.a also shows that the database 3 always has the
highest equilibrium price among all the databases. The reason is that we assume the initial market shares
of databases are η3 > η2 > η1. The advantage of having a larger initial market share leads to a higher
equilibrium price for database 3.
Figure 5.b shows the equilibrium market share under different levels of positive network externality. Each
bar denotes the market share allocation among the basic service (denoted as “B”), database m’s advanced
services (denoted as m), and sensing (denoted as “S”). We can see that the databases’ market shares
increase with the level of positive network externality, as a high level of positive network externality makes
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Fig. 6. (a) Price equilibrium, (b) Market share equilibrium, (c) The system performance vs WSDs’ sensing cost
the advanced services more attractive and attracts some high θ value WSDs from sensing. Meanwhile, the
market share of sensing decreases with the level of positive network externality. Because the increasing
equilibrium prices of the advanced services drive some low θ value WSDs to choose the basic services,
the market share of basic service increases with the level of positive network externality.
Figure 5.c shows each database’s revenue and the total social welfare (i.e., the total revenue of all
databases plus the total payoffs of WSDs) achieved at the NE, under different values of network externality
impact γ. Each bar denotes the aggregated revenue of 3 databases, while each sub-bar corresponds to
the revenue of a particular database m. The dash red line denotes the value of social welfare. The left
y-axis denotes the value of database’s revenue, and the right y-axis denotes the value of social welfare.
We can see that the databases’ aggregated revenue increases with the network externality level. This is
because when the level of positive network externality increases, high utility provided by the advanced
service drives the equilibrium prices as well as the equilibrium market shares up for all databases. The
social welfare also increases with the network externality level. As the high level of positive network
externality increases the quality of databases’ service, more WSDs choose to use the advanced service,
which is cheaper than the sensing. Overall, this improves the social welfare.
C. Performance vs Sensing Cost
Figure 6 illustrates (a) price equilibrium, (b) market share equilibrium, and (c) system performance
achieved under different sensing cost c (from 1.2 to 2.8). In this simulation, we fix the network externality
impact γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = γ = 0.4, the number of database M = 3, and the database’s operation cost as
cm = 0, m ∈M.
Figure 6.a shows the price equilibrium under different values of sensing cost. We can see that the
equilibrium market prices of databases increase with the sensing cost, as a higher sensing cost allows
databases to increases their prices without losing WSDs.
Figure 6.b shows the equilibrium market shares achieved under different values of sensing cost. Each
bar denotes the market share allocation among the basic service (denoted as “B”), database m’s advanced
services (denoted as “m”), and sensing (denoted as “S”). As the sensing cost increases, the sensing services
becomes less attractive, and hence the market share of sensing decreases with the sensing cost. Meanwhile,
the market shares of basic service and all databases’ advanced services increase with the sensing cost.
Figure 6.c shows each database’s revenue and the total social welfare (i.e., the total revenue of all
databases plus the total payoffs of WSDs) achieved at the NE, under different values of sensing cost c.
Each bar denotes the aggregated revenue of 3 databases, while each sub-bar corresponds to the revenue
of database m. The dash red line denotes the value of social welfare. The left y-axis denotes the value
of database’s revenue, and the right y-axis denotes the value of social welfare.
From Figure 6.c, we can see that the databases’ aggregated revenue increases with the sensing cost,
as the advanced services become more attractive to the WSDs. However, as the sensing cost increasing,
WSDs need to pay a higher price to enjoy a good quality of service, hence the social welfare decreases
with sensing cost.
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Fig. 7. (a) Price equilibrium, (b) Market share equilibrium, (c) the system performance vs operational cost of database.
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Fig. 8. (a) Price equilibrium, (b) Market share equilibrium, and (c) the system performance vs the operational cost of database 2.
D. Performance vs Operational Cost of Database
Figure 7 illustrates (a) the price equilibrium, (b) the market share equilibrium, and (c) the system
performance achieved under different operational costs of databases. In this simulation, we consider a
scenario of M = 3 databases with the same operational cost, i.e., c1 = c2 = c3, and change such an
operational cost from 0 to 0.2. Moreover, we fix the network externality factor γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0.4 and the
sensing cost c = 2, and select slightly different initial market shares for three databases (i.e., η3 > η2 > η1).
In Figure 7.b, each bar with “S” or “B” denotes the percentage of WSDs choosing the sensing service
or basic service, respectively, and each bar with number m ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes the percentage of WSDs
choosing database m’s advanced service. In Figure 7.c, each bar with number m ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes the
database m’s profit.
Figure 7.a shows the equilibrium market prices of databases under different operational costs. We can
see that the equilibrium market prices of all databases increase with the operational cost. This is quite
intuitive, as a higher operational cost drives the database to set a higher retail price in order to cover his
operational cost.
Figure 7.b shows the equilibrium market shares achieved under different operational costs. Each bar
denotes the market share allocation among the basic service (denoted as “B”), database m’s advanced
services (denoted as “m”), and sensing (denoted as “S”). We have shown in Figure 7.a that with the
increasing of database operational cost, all databases will set higher equilibrium market prices to cover
their operational costs. This makes the advanced services become less attractive, and hence reduces the
total market share of databases as shown in Figure 7.b. Accordingly, the market shares of both basic
service and sensing service increase.
Figure 7.c shows the databases’ profits and the total social welfare (i.e., the total profit of all databases
plus the total payoffs of WSDs) achieved at the market equilibrium, under different operational costs.
Each bar denotes the aggregated profit of 3 databases, while each sub-bar corresponds to the profit of
database m. The dash red line denotes the value of social welfare. The left y-axis denotes the value of
database’s profit, and the right y-axis denotes the value of social welfare. From Figure 7.c, we can see
that both the databases’ aggregated profit and the social welfare decrease with the operational cost.
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We further consider the scenario of different operational costs for databases. To illustrate the results
clearly, we consider a simple scenario of two databases with different operational costs. Specifically, we
fix the operational cost of database 1 as c1 = 0.2, while change the operational cost c2 of database 2
from 0 to 0.2. The other parameters are same as those in the previous simulation. Figure 8 illustrates (a)
the price equilibrium, (b) the market share equilibrium, and (c) the system performance, achieved under
different operational costs of database 2.
Figure 8.a shows the price equilibrium under different operational costs of database 2. We can see with
the increasing of operational cost c2, database 2 will select a higher equilibrium market price in order to
cover its operational cost; accordingly, database 1 can also set a higher equilibrium market price to gain
more profit, even thought its own operational cost remains unchanged. We can also see that the price
difference between two databases decreases with c2, due to the decrease of their operation cost difference.
Figure 8.b shows the equilibrium market shares achieved under different operational costs of database
2. Each bar denotes the market share allocation among the basic service (denoted as “B”), database m’s
advanced services (denoted as “m”), and sensing (denoted as “S”). We have shown in Figure 8.a that
with the increase of the database 2’s operational cost, both databases will set higher equilibrium market
prices. This makes the advanced services of both databases becomes less attractive, and hence reduces
the market share of databases and increases the the market shares of sensing service and basic service.
Moreover, the market share of database 2 decreases, while that of database 1 slightly increases. This is
because an increased operational cost of database 2 reduces its competitiveness, hence drives some of its
market share to database 1.
Figure 8.c shows the databases’ profits and the total social welfare achieved at the market equilibrium,
under different operational costs of database 2. Each bar denotes the aggregated profit of 2 databases,
while each sub-bar corresponds to the profit of database m. The dash red line denotes the value of social
welfare. The left y-axis denotes the value of database’s profit, and the right y-axis denotes the value of
social welfare. From Figure 8.c, we can see that both the databases’ aggregated profit and the social welfare
decrease with the operational cost. Moreover, the profit of database 2 decreases due to the reduction of
its market share, while that of database 1 slightly increases due to the slight increase of its market share.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an information market model called MINE GOLD, which enables the geo-
location databases to sell information regarding the white space to WSDs. We characterize the positive
network externality in the proposed information market model, and study the user subscription dynamics
and the associated market equilibrium. Based on this, we further examine the databases’ pricing decision
from a game-theoretic perspective. We discover several interesting insights of the databases’ competition
game in the information market. For example, there exists an optimal number of databases to achieve the
maximum total database revenue. Moreover, a larger positive network externality will have a more positive
impact on the system performance, both in terms of the databases’ revenues and the social welfare.
The information market proposed in this paper mainly concerns the utilization of unlicensed TV
channels, where WSDs share with others. In practice, some licensees are willing to lease their under-
utilized licensed spectrum for extra profit, and WSDs can have exclusive usage right by leasing such
spectrum. Hence, a joint market design involving both unlicensed and licensed TV channels will be an
important future research direction.
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APPENDIX
A. Property of Information Market
In this section, we will discuss the properties of positive network externality in the information market.
For illustration purpose, we first define the advanced information as the interference level on each channel,
then we characterize the information value to the WSDs, based on which we can further characterize the
properties of the information market.
1) Interference Information: For each WSD n ∈ N operating on the TV channel, each channel k is
associated with an interference level, denoted by Zn,k, which reflects the aggregate interference from all
other nearby devices (including TV stations and other WSDs) operating on this channel. Due to the fast
changing of wireless channels and the uncertainty of WSDs’ mobilities and activities, the interference
Zn,k is a random variable. We impose assumptions on the interference Zn,k as follows.
Assumption 5. For each WSD n ∈ N , each channel k’s interference level Zn,k is temporal-independence
and frequency-independence.
This assumption shows that (i) the interference Zn,k on channel k is independent identically distributed
(iid) at different times, and (ii) the interferences on different channels, Zn,k, k ∈ K, are also iid at the same
time.12 As we are talking about a general WSD n, we will omit the WSD index n in the notations (e.g.,
write Zn,k as Zk), whenever there is no confusion caused. Let HZ(·) and hZ(·) denote the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) and probability distribution function (PDF) of Zk, ∀k ∈ K.13
Usually, a particular WSD’s experienced interference Zk on a channel k consistss of the following three
components:
1) Uk: the interference from licensed TV stations;
2) Wk,j: the interference from another WSD j operating on the same channel k;
3) Vk: any other interference from outside systems.
The total interference on channel k is Zk = Uk + Wk + Vk, where Wk ,
∑
j∈Nk
Wk,j is the total
interference from all other WSDs operating on channel k (denoted by Nk). Similar to Zk, we also assume
that Uk,Wk,Wk,j, and Vk are random variables with temporal-independence (i.e., iid across time) and
frequency-independence (i.e., iid across frequency). We further assume that Wk,j is user-independence, i.e.,
Wk,j, j ∈ Nk, are iid. It is important to note that different WSDs may experience different interferences
Uk (from TV stations), Wk,j (from another WSD operating on the same channel), and Vk (from
outside systems) on a channel k, as we have omitted the WSD index n for all these notations for
clarity.
Next we discuss these interferences in more details.
• Each database is able to compute the interference Uk from TV stations to every WSD (on channel
k), as it knows the locations and channel occupancies of all TV stations.
• Each database cannot compute the interference Vk from outside systems, due to the lack of outside
interference source information. Thus, the interference Vk will not be included in a database’s
advanced information sold to WSDs.
• Each database may or may not be able to compute the interference Wk,j from another WSD j,
depending on whether WSD j subscribes to the database’s advanced service. Specifically, if WSD
j subscribes to the advanced service, the database can predict its channel selection (since the WSD
is fully rational and will always choose the channel with the lowest interference level indicated by
12Note that the iid assumption is a reasonable approximation of the practical scenario. This is because WSDs with basic service will
randomly choose one TV channel, hence the number of such WSDs per channel will follow the same distribution. For WSDs with advanced
service, they will go to the TV channel with the minimum realized interference. If the interference among each pair of users is iid over time,
then statistically the number of such users in each channel will also follow the same distribution. Note that even though all channel quality
distributions are the same, the realized instant qualities of different channels are different. Hence, the advanced information provided by the
database is still valuable as such an advanced information is accurate interference information.
13In this paper, we will conventionally use HX(·) and hX(·) to denote the CDF and PDF of a random variable X , respectively.
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the database at the time of subscription), and thus can compute its interference to any other WSD.
However, if WSD j only chooses the database’s basic service, the database cannot predict its channel
selection, and thus cannot compute its interference to other WSDs.
For convenience, we denote N [m]k , m ∈M, as the set of WSDs operating on channel k and subscribing
to the database m’s advance service (i.e., those choosing the strategy l = m), N [b]k as the set of WSDs
operating on channel k and choosing the database’s basic service (i.e., those choosing the strategy l = b),
and N [s]k as the set of WSDs operating on channel k and sensing all the available channels (i.e., those
choosing the strategy l = s). That is, ⋃m∈MN [m]k ⋃N [b]k ⋃N [s]k = Nk. Then, for a particular WSD, its
experienced interference (on channel k) known by database m is
Xmk , Uk +
∑
j∈N
[m]
k
Wk,j, (29)
which contains the interference from TV licensees and all WSDs (operating on channel k) subscribing
to the databasem’s advanced service. The WSD’s experienced interference (on channel k) not known by
the database m is
Y mk ,Vk +
∑
j∈N
[b]
k
Wk,j
+
∑
j∈N
[s]
k
Wk,j +
∑
j∈N
[i]
k
,i 6=m
Wk,j,
(30)
which contains the interference from outside systems and all WSDs (operating on channel k) not sub-
scribing to the database m’s advanced service. Obviously, both Y mk and Xmk are also random variables
with temporal- and frequency-independence. Accordingly, the total interference on channel k for a WSD
can be written as Zk = Xmk + Y mk .
Since the database m knows only Xmk , it will provide this information (instead of the total
interference Zk) as the advanced service to a subscribing WSD. It is easy to see that the more WSDs
subscribing to the database m’s advanced service, the more information the database m knows, and the
more accurate the database m’s information will be.
Next we can characterize the accuracy of a database’s information explicitly. Note that ηm and ηs
denote the fraction of WSDs choosing the database m’s advanced service and sensing service, respectively.
Moreover, (1 −
∑
m∈M ηm − ηs) denotes the fraction of WSDs choosing the basic service. Due to the
Assumption 5, it is reasonable to assume that each channel k ∈ K will be occupied by an average of N
K
WSDs. Then, among all N
K
WSDs operating on channel k, there are, on average, N
K
·ηm WSDs subscribing
to the database m’s advanced service, N
K
·ηs WSDs choosing sensing service, and NK · (1−
∑
m∈M ηm−ηs)
WSDs choosing the basic service. That is, |Nk| = NK , |N
[m]
k | =
N
K
· ηm, |N
[s]
k | =
N
K
· ηs, and |N [b]k | =
N
K
· (1−
∑
m∈M ηm− ηs).
14 Finally, by the user-independence of Wk,m, we can immediately calculate the
distributions of Xmk and Y mk under any given market share ηm m ∈M via (29) and (30).
2) Information Value: Now we evaluate the value of the database m’s advanced information to WSDs,
which is reflected by the WSD’s benefit (utility) that can be achieved from this information.
We first consider the expected utility of a WSD when choosing the database’s basic service (i.e., l = b).
In this case, the WSD will randomly choosing a TV channel based on the information provided in the
free basic service, and its expected data rate is
R[b] = EZ [R(Z)] =
∫
z
R(z)dHZ(z), (31)
where R(·) is the transmission rate function (e.g., the Shannon capacity) under any given interference.
As shown in Section A1, each channel k ∈ K will be occupied by an average of N
K
WSDs based on the
14Note that the above discussion is from the aspect of expectation, and in a particular time period, the realized numbers of WSDs in
different channels may be different.
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Assumption 5. Hence, R[b] depends only on the distribution of the total interference Zk, while not on the
specific distributions of Xmk and Y mk . Then the expected utility provided by the basic service is:
B = U
(
R[b]
)
, (32)
where U(·) is the utility function of the WSD. We can easily check that the accuracy of the database m’s
information does not affect the utilities of theses WSDs not subscribing to the database m’s advanced
service.
Then we consider the expected utility of a WSD when choosing the sensing service (i.e., l = s). In
this case, the WSD will sense all the available channels and select one with the lowest interference level.
Hence, its expected data rate is
R[s] = EZ(1) [R(Z)] =
∫
z
R(z)dHZ(1)(z), (33)
where Z(1) , min{Z1, ..., ZK} denotes the minimum interference on all channels, HZ(1)(z) = [1−HZ(z)]K
is the CDF of Z(1), and R(·) is the transmission rate function (e.g., the Shannon capacity). We can check
that R[s] depends only on the distribution of the total interference Zk, while not on the specific distributions
of Xmk and Y mk . Then the expected utility provided by the sensing service is:
S = U
(
R[s]
)
, (34)
where U(·) is the utility function of the WSD. We can easily check that the accuracy of the database m’s
information does not affect the utilities of theses WSDs not subscribing to the database m’s advanced
service. We, therefore, have the Assumption 1.
Then we consider the expected utility of a WSD when subscribing to the database m’s advance
service (i.e., l = m,m ∈ M). In this case, the database m returns the interference {Xmk }k∈K to the
WSD subscribing to the advanced service, together with the basic information such as the available
channel list. For a rational WSD, it will always choose the channel with the minimum Xmk (since
{Y mk }k∈K are iid). Let X [m](1) = min{Xm1 , . . . , XmK} denote the minimum interference indicated by the
database m’s advanced information. Then, the actual interference experienced by a WSD (subscribing to
the database m’s advanced service) can be formulated as the sum of two random variables, denoted by
Zm[a] = X
m
(1) + Y
m
. Accordingly, the WSD’s expected data rate under the strategy l = m can be computed
by
Rma (ηm) = EZm[a]
[
R
(
Zm[a]
) ]
=
∫
z
R(z)dHZm
[a]
(z), (35)
where HZm
[a]
(z) is the CDF of Zm[a]. It is easy to see that Rma depends on the distributions of Xmk and Y mk ,
and thus depend on the market share ηm. Thus, we will write Rma as Rma (ηm). Accordingly, the advanced
service’s utility is:
Am(ηm) , U
(
Rma (ηm)
)
(36)
By further checking the properties of B, S, and Am(ηm), we have the Assumption 2-4.
B. Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. By solving (3), we can get three thresholds, denoted by
θtSB ,
c
S−B
, θtAB ,
pi1
A1(ηt1)−B
, θtSA ,
c−pi1
S−A1(ηt1)
.
Consider two cases: (i) θtSB > θtAB, and (ii) θtSB ≤ θtAB.
(i) When θtSB > θtAB, it is easy to check that
θtSA − θ
t
SB =
c ·
(
A1(η
t
1)− B
)
− pi1 · (S − B)(
S − A1(ηt1)
)
· (S − B)
> 0,
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since S > A1
(
ηt1
)
, S > B, and c · (A1(ηt1) − B) > pi1 · (S − B) as θtSB > θtAB. Hence, we have:
θtSA > θ
t
SB > θ
t
AB. Accordingly, the newly derived market share is:
ηt1 = θ
t
SA − θ
t
AB,
(ii) When θtSB ≤ θtAB, we can similarly check that θtSA − θtSB < 0, and hence θtSA < θtSB < θtAB.
Accordingly, the newly derived market share ηt1 is
ηt1 = 0.
Formally, based on the above (i) and (ii), we can get the result in (4).
C. Proof for Proposition 1
Proof. By Definition 1, η∗1 is an equilibrium point, if and only if it is a solution of (6). We consider two
cases: (i) θSB > θAB and (ii) θSB ≤ θAB.
(i) If θSB > θAB, the solution η1 should satisfy
△η1(η1) =
c− pi1
S −A1(η1)
−
pi1
A1(η
t
1)− B
− η1 = 0. (37)
It is easy to check that △η1(η1)|η1=0 > 0 and △η1(η1)|η1=1 < 0. As △η1(η1) is continuous on [0, 1], we
have: △η1(η1) = 0 has at least one root on [0, 1].
(ii) If θSB ≤ θAB, the solution η∗1 = 0 directly.
D. Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. To prove the uniqueness, we need to show that the function △η1(η1) in (37) is strictly decreasing
on [0, 1]. First, we can easily check that if
g′(η1) ·
[
c− pi1
(S −A1(η1))2
+
pi1
(A1(η1)−B)2
]
< 1, (38)
then the first derivative of △η1(η1) is negative, hence △η1(η1) in (37) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1].
We further notice that c−pi1
(S−A1(η1))
≤ 1 and pi1
A1(η1)−B
≤ 1, and
g′(η1) ·
[
c− pi1
(S − A1(η1))2
+
pi1
(A1(η1)− B)2
]
≤ max
{
c− pi1
(S − A1(η1))
,
pi1
(A1(η1)− B)
}
·
A′1(η1)
A1(η1)−B
·
S −B
S − A1(η1)
.
(39)
Hence, the condition in (38) is satisfied when
max
η1∈[0,1]
A′1(η1)
A1(η1)− B
·
S − B
S − A1(η1)
≤ 1, (40)
E. Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. By Propositions 1 and 2, together with the non-decreasing of g(·), we can get the conclusion.
F. Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. By Proposition 2, there exist an one-to-one mapping between the information price and market
share. Hence, we can get the conclusion immediately.
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G. Proof for Proposition 4
Proof. The proof for the existence is straightforward. Next we show there exists an unique optimal price
under both the low sensing cost region and high sensing cost region.
We first look at the database’s revenue under high sensing cost region: ΠDB1 (η1) = (pi1 − c1) · η1(pi1),
where η1(pi1) is given by
1−
pi1
A(η1)− B
− η1 = 0.
The second order derivative of ΠDB1 (pi) with respect to pi1 is
∂2ΠDB1
∂pi21
= 2 ·
dη1
dpi1
+ (pi1 − c1) ·
d2η1
dpi21
.
It is easily to verify that
d2η1
dpi21
= −pi1 ·
[A1(η1)−B]A′1(η1)
[pi1A′1(η1)− (A1(η1)− B)
2]4
≤ 0.
where A′1(η1) = dA1(η1)/dpi1 > 0. Moreover, η1(pi1) decreases with pi1. Therefore, we have
∂2ΠDB1
∂pi21
< 0,
and thus there exist a unique solution that maximizes ΠDB1 (pi1).
Similarly, we can prove that under the high price region, there exists an unique solution that maximizes
ΠDB1 (pi1).
H. Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. Given market shares {ηt1, ηt2, . . . , ηtM} in slot t with ηtM > ηtM−1 > . . . > ηt1, we have: S >
AM(η
t
M) > AM−1(η
t
M−1) > . . . > A1(η
t
1). Notice that no WSD is willing to choose a service with a lower
QoS and a higher price. Hence, we can focus on the non-trivial scenario with c > piM > piM−1 > . . . > pi1,
under which we can get the conclusion immediately by solving (16) - (18).
I. Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. By Definition 2 , η∗ is an equilibrium point, if and only if it it a solution of (21). Given market
shares {ηt1, ηt2, . . . , ηtM} in slot t with ηtM > ηtM−1 > . . . > ηt1, the solution η should satisfy

c− piM
S − AM(ηM)
−
piM − piM−1
AM (ηM)−AM−1(ηM−1)
− ηM = 0,
pim+1 − pim
Am+1(ηm+1)−Am(ηm)
−
pim − pim−1
Am(ηm)−Am−1(ηm−1)
− ηm = 0, ∀m = 2, . . . ,M − 1,
pi2 − pi1
A2(η2)− A1(η1)
−
pi1
A1(η1)−B
− η1 = 0.
(41)
By solving the above equation, we can get the conclusion immediately.
J. Proof for Proposition 5
Proof. We first notice that the best response dynamics must converge to a market share equilibrium, as
the changing of each database’s market share is monotonic. This is due to the positive externality of
information market, under which a database with an increased market share in a slot tends to get more
market share in the future.
Next, we can easily find that given a particular market share set in a slot, the best response dynamics
will evolve to a fixed newly derived market share set in the next slot, and eventually converge to a unique
market share equilibrium.
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K. Proof for Proposition 6
Proof. If η∗A is a Nash equilibrium of MSCG, then we have:
η∗m = argmax
ηm
Π˜DBm (ηm,η
∗
−m) (42)
By (25), we further have:
pim =
∑M+1
m=1
[(
1−
∑M+1
n=m ηn
)
· (g(ηm)− g(ηm−1))
]
(43)
Hence, we can easily check that pi∗ is a Nash equilibrium of PCG, where
pi∗m = arg max
pim≥0
ΠDBm (pim,pi
∗
−m), ∀m ∈M. (44)
L. Proof for Lemma 3
Proof. For convenience, we first give the formal definition of supermodular game and some related
important concepts [21]. A real n−diensional set V is a sublattice of Rn if for any two elements
a, b ∈ V , the component-wise minimum, a ∨ b, and the component-wise maximum, a ∧ b, are also in
V . Particularly, a compact sublattice has a smallest and largest element. A function f(x1, . . . , fN) has
increasing differences in (xi, xj) for all i 6= j if f(x1, . . . , x1i , . . . , xN )−f(x1, . . . , x2i , . . . , xN ) is increasing
in xj for all x2i − x1i > 0.15 The formal definition of a supermodular game is given below:
Definition 4 (Supermodular Game [21]). A noncooperative game (M, {S}m∈M, {Um}m∈M) is called a
supermodular game if the following conditions are all satisfied:
• The strategy set Sm is a nonempty and compact sublattice of real number.
• The payoff function Um is supermodular in player m’s own strategy.16
• The payoff function Um has increasing differences in all sets of strategies.
To prove the existence of equilibrium under duopoly scenario, we only need to prove that the MSCG
is a supermodular game under duopoly scenario with respect to η1 and −η2. Since the two databases
with a single instrument η = (η1, η2) chosen from a compact set [0, 1]2, it suffices to show that both
Π˜DB1 (η1,−η2) and Π˜DB2 (η1,−η2) have increasing difference in (η1, η2). By (25) and (26), we have:
∂2Π˜DB1 (η1,−η2)
∂(η1)∂−η2
=
dA1
dη1
· η1 + (A2 − B) ≥ 0 (45)
∂2Π˜DB2 (η1,−η2)
∂(η1)∂−η2
= A1 − B ≥ 0 (46)
Hence, we can conclude that MSCG is a supermodular game with respect to η1 and −η2.
15If the function f is twice differentiable, the property is equivalent to ∂2f/∂xi∂xj ≥ 0
16A function is always supermodular in a single variable.
26
M. Proof for Proposition 7
Proof. To prove the existence of equilibrium under oligopoly scenario, we only need to prove that
Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m), ∀m ∈M, is quasi-concave in ηm [22].
To prove Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m) is quasi-concave in ηm, it is sufficient to show that
∂Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂ηm
changes the
sign once. We first notice that ηm is chosen from [0, 1], and
lim
ηm→0
∂Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂ηm
> 0, and lim
ηm→+1
∂Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂ηm
< 0. (47)
Then we consider the second order derivative of Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m) with respect to ηm. We have:
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm)
∂η2m
= −(γ2m + 3γm + 1) · ηm + γm · (γm + 1) ·
(
1−
M∑
h=m+1
ηh
)
, (48)
which is a linear function of ηm. We can further check that
lim
ηm→0
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂η2m
> 0, and lim
ηm→+1
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂η2m
< 0.
Hence, the second order derivative of ∂
2Π˜DBm (ηm)
∂η2m
is first positive when ηm is less than a threshold, and
then changes to negative when ηm is larger than a threshold. This implies that the first order derivative
∂Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)/∂ηm first increases (from a positive value), and then decreases to a negative value, hence
it changes the sign only once.
N. Proof for Proposition 8
Proof. To prove the uniqueness of NE, we only need to verify that:
−
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂(−ηm)
2 ≥
∑
j 6=m
∂2Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
∂(−ηm)∂ηn
, ∀m ∈M. (49)
The above condition is usually called the dominant diagonal condition. Hence, as long as Π˜DBm (ηm,η−m)
satisfy the above condition, the MSCG has a unique NE, so does the original PCG [21].
